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Premium subsidies have been advocated as an alternative to social health 
insurance. These subsidies are paid if expenditure on health insurance exceeds a 
given share of income. In this paper, we examine whether this approach is 
superior to social insurance from a welfare perspective. We show that the results 
crucially depend on the correlation of health and productivity. For a positive 
correlation, we find that combining premium subsidies with social insurance is 
the optimal policy. 
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Private health insurance markets discriminate according to risk of illness. Those
with a higher risk of illness usually have to pay higher premiums than those with a
lower risk. In many countries, this price discrimination is regarded as unjust, vio-
lating equity principles such as ‘equal access’ or ‘solidarity’. A common solution
are social health insurance schemes which establish transfers from low risks to
high risks by forcing all citizens into one health insurance contract with a uniform
premium.
In a recent paper, Zweifel and Breuer (2006a) fundamentally question this equity
argument in favor of social insurance. They maintain that being a high risk does
not necessarily imply that a person should receive transfers:
“[Uniform premiums] result in a cross-subsidization of high-risk by
low-risk, low-income individuals. This can result in counter-pro-
ductive effects. For example, a healthy young worker subsidizes a
wealthy older manager who is a heavy user of medical services.
Equity considerations seem to call for redistribution from everyone
else to the double disadvantaged, viz. the high-risk, low-income indi-
viduals.” [Zweifel and Breuer (2006a), p. 172]
Based on the above argument Zweifel and Breuer propose to substitute social
insurance by “premiums subsidies”. These subsidies are targeted to individuals
whose expenditure on health insurance exceeds a given share of income. By this
policy, they want to focus transfers on high-risk, low-income individuals.
Zweifel and Breuer also advance efﬁciency arguments for risk-based premiums,
stating that these allow cost sharing to be tailored to the individual risk type,
thereby dealing better with moral hazard. In addition, they point out that risk-
based premiums avoid possible costs due to risk selection induced by uniform
premiums. This applies if social insurance is provided by competing insurers.
The case for social insurance also depends on the severity of risk discrimination
in private health insurance markets. For the individual health insurance market in
the US, Pauly and Herring (1999, 2007) ﬁnd that premiums are not proportional
1to risk, pointing to a substantial amount of risk pooling. However, risk pooling
is only partial because higher health risk is signiﬁcantly related to higher premi-
ums overall and to lower coverage rates in unregulated states [Pauly and Herring
(2007), p. 775–776].
Social insurance is also defended by its effect on the income distribution. Em-
pirical studies show that poverty and ill-health are positively correlated.1 For this
reason, McGuire (2006) argues that social insurance may well be optimal from a
second-best perspective. It not only redistributes to those with higher health risks
but also tendsto makethepoorbetteroff. Formally, thislineof reasoninghas been
analyzed by Cremer and Pestieau (1996) who show that a positive correlation of
health and income provides a strong argument for social insurance.
Van de Ven (2006) criticizes the concept of premium subsidies advocated by
Zweifel and Breuer. He points out that high-risk, low-income consumers have
little incentive to shop around for a well-priced health plan if their premiums are
subsidized. Furthermore, the fact that they receive a subsidy at the margin cre-
ates a moral hazard problem. These individuals will tend to over-insure.2 Zweifel
and Breuer (2006b) also mention a negative incentive effect of their proposal.
Low-income individuals who receive a premium subsidy effectively face a higher
marginal tax rate as the subsidy is decreasing in income.
Whether premium subsidies in combination with risk-based premiums are an al-
ternativetosocialinsuranceisthereforeanopenissue. ThefactthatinSwitzerland
premium subsidies go along with social insurance also raises the questionwhether
premium subsidies are substitutes or complements to social insurance.
In the following, we analyze these questions in a theoretical framework. We allow
for heterogeneity in productivity and risk types. The government maximizes a
social welfare function and uses a linear income tax to redistribute between high
and low-productivity individuals. To support
high-risk individuals, it can pay premium subsidies if expenditure for health in-
1See, e.g., van Doorslaer et al. (1997), Gerdtham and Johannesson (2000) and Breyer et
al. (2003).
2Van de Ven (2006) also advocates an alternative consisting of risk-based and non-means-
tested subsidies which is explained in detail in van de Ven et al. (2000). A similar proposal has
been made by Pauly et al. (1992) who want to introduce refundable tax credits which reﬂect a
household’s risk category and are inversely related to household income.
2surance exceeds a given share of pre-tax income or introduce social insurance.
Since Zweifel and Breuer want to target transfers to the worst-off in society, we
pay particular attention to the solutions for a maximin social welfare function. In
addition, we present results for the utilitarian welfare function.
We examinethree schemes in detail. The benchmark is social insurancecombined
with optimal linear taxation, a scheme which has been analyzed in detail by Cre-
mer and Pestieau (1996).3 The second is the proposal by Zweifel and Breuer with
risk-based premiums and premium subsidies. The third scheme combines pre-
mium subsidies with social insurance, an approach which is taken in Switzerland.
Building on these results, we extend the analysis and examine whether different
combinations of social insurance and premium subsidies can increase welfare.
Our model takes explicitlyinto consideration theincentiveeffects on laborsupply,
in particular, those due to changes in the marginal tax rate induced by premium
subsidies. Furthermore, we allow for different degrees of correlation of health
and productivity. To keep the analysis tractable, we abstract from further moral
hazard problems. For private health insurance markets, we assume that premiums
are actuarially fair given an individual’s risk type. Therefore, we do not consider
partial risk-pooling in the private health insurance market.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Section 3
introduces premium subsidies and examines when these will be claimed by indi-
viduals. In Section 4 we present the general problem of choosing premium subsi-
dies and social insurance and analyze different solutions. Section 5 concludes.
3A similar analysis can be found in Blomqvist and Horn (1984). Boadway et al. (2003, 2006)
extend the analysis by Cremer and Pestieau (1996) to include moral hazard and adverse selection.
They show that with moral hazard, the case for public intervention in insurance markets remains.
The introduction of adverse selection has the effect of fostering social insurance. Netzer and
Scheuer(2007)ﬁndthat moresocial insurancecanbe counterproductiveinthe presenceofadverse
selection if individuals have a precautionary labor motive.
32 The model
We consider an economy in which individuals supply labor and consume one nu-
meraire good. Labor supply is denoted by l and consumption of the numeraire by
c. The earning ability of an individual is w, implying labor income wl. Individu-
als become ill with probability π. If ill, they require treatment leading to medical
expenditure L. We assume that medical treatment fully restores health in a short
period of time and therefore has no effect on labor supply. The utility function
u(c,l) is increasing in consumption, decreasing in labor supply, and strictly quasi-
concave. Furthermore, ∂2u/∂c2 <0, which impliesthat individualsare risk averse
in consumption. Individuals maximize expected utility.
Individuals differ in their earnings ability wi (w1 < w2) and in their probability of
falling ill πj (πl < πh). This gives rise to 2×2-types, where θij is the fraction of
ij-types. The share of productivity type i is given by θi and the share of high risks
among each productivity type is denoted by κi. Hence, the proportions of the four
types in the population can be written as
θ1h = θ1κ1, θ1l = θ1(1−κ1), θ2h = θ2κ2, θ2l = θ2(1−κ2). (1)
If κ1 > κ2, i.e., if there are relatively more high risks among low-productivity
individuals, then productivity and health are positively correlated.
The government maximizes a social welfare function. As Cremer and Pestieau
(1996) and Zweifel and Breuer (2006a), we suppose that the government cannot
make transfers contingent on π. We also make the standard assumption in prob-
lems of income taxation that the government can observe labor income y = wl but
neither productivity w nor hours worked l. However, the government knows the
joint distribution of both characteristics, π and w. An income tax is available for
redistributive purposes. The tax schedule T(y) is assumed to be linear, consisting
of a marginal tax rate t and a uniform lump-sum transfer τ:
T(wl) = twl−τ.
In addition, the government can introduce social insurance which covers a share s
of the possible health expenditures at a uniform premium. A uniform contribution
s¯ πL by each individual guarantees that social insurance has a balanced budget in
4expectation. Here ¯ π is the average probability of illness,
¯ π ≡ (θ1h+θ2h)πh+(θ1l +θ2l)πl. (2)
On the private health insurance market individuals can buy insurance coverage
I at an actuarially fair premium πjI. Without premium subsidies, we can apply
Mossin’s theorem [Mossin (1968)], which states that individuals will fully insure:













The ﬁrst-order condition for I calls for equality of the marginal utilities of income






With premium subsidies, individuals may have the incentive to buy even more
insurance. We rule out this possibility by restricting coverage to medical expen-
diture not paid for by social insurance. Individuals will therefore always purchase
coverage I∗ = (1−s)L.
In the following, we consider two social welfare functions. Zweifel and Breuer
(2006a) want to target transfers to the worst-off in society, i.e., low-income, high-
risk individuals. This objective can be captured by a maximin welfare function.
In a second-best environment, welfare W will then always be given by the utility
of the low-productivity, high-risk individuals, i.e.,
W = min{u1h,u1l,u2h,u2l} = u1h. (3)




To illustrate our results, we frequently use GHH-preferences, a generalized ver-
sion of quasi-linear utility introduced by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman

















for ν = 1
(5)
where ν is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion and ε > 0 the elasticity of labor
supply. Since there is no income effect on labor supply, the compensated and
uncompensated elasticity of labor supply coincide.
3 Premium subsidies
The key element of the proposal by Zweifel and Breuer (2006a) are premium sub-
sidies. In this section, we analyze the effect of these subsidies on the behavior of
individuals given that a tax and transfer system is in place. This analysis prepares
for the study of the optimal tax and transfer policy in Section 4.
Following Zweifel and Breuer (2006a), the objective of premium subsidies is to
avoid that expenditures for health insurance exceed a given share of pre-tax in-
come yij = wilij. We denote this “health insurance limit” by γ. For example, if
γ = 0.1, then net health insurance expenditures cannot be more than 10 percent
of labor income. Therefore, the premium subsidy needs to cover any positive dif-
ference between the maximum amount which has to be paid for health insurance,













This showsthat a smallerhealth insurance limitγ impliesamore generous subsidy
scheme. Furthermore, expenditures on overall health insurance depend on the
extent of social insurance s through pj. Zweifel and Breuer consider only the case
4The general form is
U(c,l) = u(c−G(l))












Figure 1: Budget constraint
with no social insurance, i.e., s = 0. Our analysis is more general because we also
allow for a combination of premium subsidies and social insurance.
If an individual receives a positive premium subsidy, consumption is
cij = (1−t)wilij+τ− pj +σij = (1−γ−t)wilij+τ.







which is shown in Figure 1. Whether or not an individual obtains a premium
subsidy depends on whether the optimal solution is to the left or right of the kink.
If the highest attainable indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint to
the left of l′ at the optimum, individuals will claim the premium subsidy. If it is
tangent to the right of l′, they pay their premiums themselves.
To determine the factors inducing an individual to claim a premium subsidy, we
compare the individual optimum for both parts of the budget constraint. Given




s.t c = (1−γ−t)wl+τ
(9)
yielding the indirect utility function ˆ V(τ,t +γ,w). Comparative-static analysis


















s.t c = (1−t)wl+τ− p.
(10)













Setting ˆ V = V deﬁnes ˆ γ, the critical value of the health insurance limit where
individualsareindifferentbetween claimingandnon-claiming. Dueto∂ˆ V/∂γ<0,
an individual will claim if and only if γ < ˆ γ.5
The critical value ˆ γ generally depends on τ,t,w and p. Turning ﬁrst to the effect







For a given value of γ, this shows that it is more likely that individuals with higher
health insurance premiums will claim because they have a higher critical value ˆ γ.
5Thispresupposesthat ˆ V(τ,1,w) ≤V(τ,t,w,p), i.e.,individualsdonotclaimif γ+t =1. Ifthis
condition is violated, individuals would prefer consumption c = τ to working and paying health










dyi = (1−ˆ γ2−t)
dci
dyi = (1−ˆ γ1−t)
ˆ y1 y1 ˆ y2 y2
Figure 2: Agent monotonicity
Withrespecttotheothervariablesdetermining ˆ γ, thesignisnotdeterminateunless
one further speciﬁes preferences. As in most studies on optimal income taxation,
we assume that Seade’s (1982) condition of agent monotonicity is fulﬁlled. This
condition requires that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
pre-tax income is smaller for high-productivity individuals’ preferences at any












Agent monotonicity implies ∂ˆ γ/∂w < 0. This is shown in Figure 2 where low-
productivity individuals are indifferent between claiming and non-claiming if




. By agent monotonicity, the indifference curves
of high-productivity individuals are less steep. Thus, they prefer not to claim if






Assumingagent monotonicityand denotingby ˆ γij ≡ ˆ γ(τ,t,wi,pj) thecritical value
of individuals with productivity i and risk type j, the derivatives ∂ˆ γ/∂p > 0 and
9∂ˆ γ/∂w < 0 lead to the following ranking, provided that there is no or incomplete
social insurance (s < 1 implying pl < ph):
(i) ˆ γ1h
(ii)/(iii) ˆ γ1l or ˆ γ2h. If a large share of health insurance is covered by






< 0 and ˆ γ1l > ˆ γ2h for s = 1. (13)
(iv) ˆ γ2l
With full social insurance, health insurance premiums are uniform. In this case,
the budget constraints are independent of the risk type and the critical values de-
pend only on productivity with ˆ γ1h = ˆ γ1l > ˆ γ2h = ˆ γ2l.
For the GHH-utility function (5), the critical values can be derived explicitly (see
Appendix A.1). Setting ˆ V equal to V yields




This term is increasing in w as the utility function (5) satisﬁes the agent mono-
tonicity condition.6
Figure 3 illustrates for GHH-preferences the effect of a premium subsidy targeted
to low-productivity high-risk individuals in the absence of social insurance. We
focus on low-productivity individuals. Initially, there is no premium subsidy. The
budget constraints run parallel, with the 1h-types’ being below the 1l-types’ be-
cause of the higher insurance premium. Since there is no income effect on labor
supply with GHH-preferences, both individualswould supply the same amount of
labor l∗
1l = l∗
1h (points A and B), implying utility U1h for 1h-types. Now consider
a premium subsidy scheme with γ set equal to ˆ γ1l. Assuming that 1l-types do not


































dl1j = (1−ˆ γ1l −t)w1
ˆ U1l =U1l = ˆ U1h
U1h
l∗
1h(γ = ˆ γ1l) l∗
1h(γ ≥ ˆ γ1h) = l∗





Figure 3: Budget and incentive constraints for low-productivity types
claim when indifferent, their optimum is described by point A with utility ˆ U1l. By
contrast, 1h-types will claim. They reach the same utility in pointC as 1l-types in
point A.
The negative effect of premium subsidies noted by Zweifel and Breuer (2006b)
becomes evident in Figure 3. In order to obtain premium subsidies, claiming
individuals of type 1h reduce their labor supply to l∗
1h(γ = ˆ γ1l). This also shows
that the labor supply function is not continuous. There is downward jump in labor
supply when γ falls below the critical value ˆ γij.
Figure 3 assumes that the tax rate and the lump-sum transfer stay constant. There-
fore, it does not compare two equilibria. If individuals claim premium subsidies,
then the incometax system must be adjusted to ﬁnance the additionalexpenditure.
This is taken into account in the following section where we analyze the gov-
ernment’s problem of simultaneously choosing premium subsidies, social health
insurance coverage and an optimal linear income tax.
114 Optimal social insurance and transfers
4.1 The general problem
In this section, we analyze how a government can optimally design a tax and
transfer system by choosing the parameters t, τ, s and γ. So far, the literature has
only examined the choice of the ﬁrst three variables.7
We formulate the government’s budget constraint in per capita terms. Denot-
ing optimal labor supply by l∗
ij = lij(t,τ,s,γ), per capita tax revenue is given by
t∑ijθijwilij(t,τ,s,γ). Per capita expenditure consists of the lump-sum transfer τ











Social insurance coverage, s, is assumed to be in the interval [0,1]. It is restricted
to full coverage as otherwise individuals may pretend to be ill. The government’s














Although problem (15) only contains one constraint apart from the limitation on
s, it is not easy to solve analytically. As shown in Figure 3, there are “jumps” in
labor supply if a group switches from non-claiming to claiming.8 Therefore, our
approach is ﬁrst to focus on a number of interesting cases:
(a) No premium subsidies: γ ≥ ˆ γ1h.
This is the problem examined by Cremer and Pestieau (1996). We analyze
this case in Section 4.2. It serves as the benchmark case.
7See Blomqvist andHorn(1984)andCremerand Pestieau (1996). Ideally,the optimalsolution
would allow for a non-linear income tax. However, this is a complex problem. It has only been
analyzed for the special case of a perfect correlation of productivity and health [see Cremer and
Pestieau (1996), Section 4].
8For γ ≥ ˆ γij optimal labor supply is given by the solution to problem (10) while for γ < ˆ γij
optimal labor supply follows from problem (9).
12(b) The Zweifel-Breuer proposal: s = 0, ˆ γ1h > γ ≥ max{ˆ γ1l,ˆ γ2h}.
Zweifel and Breuer propose to abandon social insurance. Premium subsi-
dies for risk-based premiums are to be targeted to low-productivity high-
risk types which requires ˆ γ1h > γ ≥ max{ˆ γ1l,ˆ γ2h}. This case is studied in
Section 4.3.
(c) The Swiss approach: s = 1, ˆ γ1 > γ ≥ ˆ γ2.
Switzerland combines social health insurance with premium subsidies to all
low-productivityindividuals,calling for ˆ γ1 >γ≥ ˆ γ2. We discuss this regime
in Section 4.4.
In Sections 4.2 to 4.4, we assume that the government maximizes a maximin so-
cial welfare function. This is motivated by Zweifel and Breuer’s emphasis of the
worst-off in society. In Section 4.5, we extend the analysis. First, we examine
how a utilitarian welfare function changes the results. Second, we consider in-
terior solutions for social insurance as well as more generous premium subsidies
schemes.
4.2 No premium subsidies
In this section, we brieﬂy replicate the analysis by Cremer and Pestieau (1996)
who derive conditions for optimal income taxation and social insurance in the
absence of premium subsidies. This applies if γ ≥ ˆ γ1h. This case will serve as a
benchmark in the following. Since the parameter γ is irrelevant by assumption,
we drop it in this section.






Maximizing expected utility subject to (16) yields the optimal values cij(t,τ,s),
lij(t,τ,s) and the indirect utility functionVij(t,τ,s).
In absence of premium subsidies, the government’s budget constraint is given by
τ = t∑ijθijwilij(t,τ,s). The policy instruments are t,τ and s. Thus, the govern-
13ment’s problem is given by
max
t,τ,s
W s.t. τ = t∑
ij
θijwilij(t,τ,s), s ∈ [0,1]. (17)
To characterize the optimum, we use the deﬁnition of the net social marginal val-














It captures the effect of an increased transfer τ on the objective function via the
individual’sutilityand via the effect on the budget constraint through labor supply
changes, both measured in terms of government revenues. With the Slutsky de-
composition, the optimal tax rate t∗ can be shown to meet the standard condition








It reﬂects the trade-off between efﬁciency and equity that is fundamental to the
theory of optimal taxation. The covariance Cov(wil∗
ij,bij) can be interpreted as
a welfare-based measure of inequality and reﬂects the goal of redistribution. A
large negative correlation makes a higher tax rate more desirable. The distorting
effect of taxation is captured by the denominator, which is increasing in ε, the
compensated elasticity of labor supply, calling for lower tax rates.





≤ 0 s∗ = 0
= 0 if 0 < s∗ < 1
≥ 0 s∗ = 1.
(20)
If Cov(πj,bij) is always positive, we must have s∗ = 1. A positive correlation of
health and productivity provides a strong argument for this case. The intuition
is that not only high-risk types beneﬁt from social insurance. In addition, many
low-income types are made better off. Social insurance redistributes to these in-
dividuals without distortions and is important even though an income tax exists.
9In the deﬁnition of bij, the Lagrange multiplier λ∗ needs to be multiplied with the share of
ij-types, θij, to take into account that there are more individuals of one type.
14Themodelby Cremer and Pestieau (1996)therefore providesajustiﬁcationforthe
argument by McGuire (2006) that social insurance can be optimal from a second-
best perspective if poverty and ill health are positively correlated. However, it
remains to be seen whether this argument still holds if one also considers pre-
mium subsidies.
For GHH preferences (5) and maximin welfare, Cov(πj,bij) > 0 as long as t < 1.
This is due to the fact that there is no income effect on labor supply which implies
b1h > 0,b1l = b2l = b2h = 0. Hence, s∗ = 1 is the solution irrespective of the
correlation between health and productivity [see Appendix A.2 for an explicit
solution].
4.3 The Zweifel-Breuer proposal
In this section, we examine the proposal by Zweifel and Breuer (ZB). They want
to abandon social insurance, i.e., set s = 0 and to introduce premium subsidies
targeted to the worst-off. These are 1h-types in the present context. The health
insurance limit must thus be smaller than ˆ γ1h because otherwise 1h-types would
not receive a premium subsidy. To rule out that other individuals claim, γ cannot
be lower than the second-ranking critical value ˆ γij which is either ˆ γ1l or ˆ γ2h. This
gives rise to the following incentive constraint
ˆ γ1h > γ ≥ max{ˆ γ1l,ˆ γ2h}. (21)




where the premium subsidy for 1h-types is given by σ1h = phL−γw1l1h(t,τ,0,γ).
To ﬁnd the optimal solution for the ZB proposal, the parameters t,τ and γ must be
chosen as to maximize social welfare subject to the incentive constraint (21) and







ˆ γ1h > γ ≥ max{ˆ γ1l,ˆ γ2h}.
ZB want to target transfers to the worst-off in society. Therefore, we pay par-
ticular attention to the solutions for the maximin social welfare function with
W = ˆ V1h(t,τ,0,γ). In combination with GHH preferences, this allows us to de-
rive some analytical results (see Appendix A.3). Results for the utilitarian welfare
function are presented in Section 4.5.1.
Comparing the optimal solutions for the ZB proposal and the model by Cremer
and Pestieau (CP) which implies full social insurance, we can derivethe following
result:
Proposition 1: With GHH preferences (5), the ZB proposal makes the worst-off
(1h-types) better off compared to full social insurance without premium subsidies
if γ∗ = ˆ γ1l and the share of 1h-types is small. Only if there are no high risks
among high-productivity types, do the two solutions lead to the same welfare.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
The intuition behind this result is that the efﬁciency losses due to premium sub-
sidies are small if these are claimed by few individuals. The gains, by contrast,
are large as transfers are now targeted. The regimes are only equivalent when all
high risks are low-productivity types. In this case, the ZB regime has no targeting
advantage.
Tofurtherexaminethefactorswhichregimeissuperior,weexaminethedifference
in the welfare of both regimes,
∆W ≡WZB−WCP.
We start from a situation in which both regimes lead to the same welfare, W =
WZB =WCP.10 Applying the Envelope Theorem, we obtain the following results
10AssumingWZB =WCP allows to focus on the pros and cons of each regime. The analysis can
also be performed forWZB  =WCP. In this case, there are additional level effects (different values
of α in equations (24) and (25) for each regime) which yield no additional insights.
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WZB=WCP
= αθ2(πh−πl)L > 0, (25)
where α = (1−ν)W− ν
1−ν and
δ ≡ (t∗−(1−γ∗−t∗)ε(t∗+γ∗))w1+ε
1 +πhL > 0.
Theterm δmeasures thetransfers to1h-typesin theZB proposaland thetax losses
due to reduced labor supply.
Equation (24) shows that an increase in the share of high risks among low-pro-
ductivity individuals, κ1, has a negative effect in the CP model as measured by
θ1(πh−πl)Lsincesocialinsurancepremiumsmustincrease. Thismakeseveryone
worse off, including the worst-off. No such effect is present in the ZB proposal.
However, more high risks claim premium subsidies. These require additional
transfers and supply less labor, implying a lower tax base. This negative effect
of the ZB proposal is captured by θ1δ. If the difference in illness probabilities
is sufﬁciently small, the effects for the ZB proposal are stronger, making the CP
model superior.
Equation (25) reveals that an increase in the share of high-productivityindividuals
who are high risks, κ2, has a negative effect in the CP model captured by θ2(πh−
πl)L. Again, this is the increase in social insurance premiums. In the ZB proposal
there is no effect, as θ2h-types do not receive a transfer and labor supply is not





   
 
WZB=WCP,ˆ γ1l>ˆ γ2h
= αθ2hL > 0, (26)
which can be explained as follows: an increase in πh has a negative effect on the
social insurance premium in the CP model measured by (θ1h+θ2h)L. In the ZB
proposal, by contrast, only the transfers to 1h-types increase. This effect is less
severe and captured by θ1hL, resulting in a net advantageof (θ1h+θ2h)L−θ1hL=
θ2hL.11
11If ˆ γ1l ≤ ˆ γ2h, there can also be an effect on the incentive constraint since ˆ γ2h depends on πh.
17Productivity and  health
positively correlated








Figure 4: Comparison between ZB and CP
GHH utility, w1 = 5, w2 = 10, πl = 0.2, πh = 0.5, θ1 = 0.5, L = 15, ε = 1.
With respect to the other parameters of the model, it is not possible to derive
obvious results. We therefore perform numerical simulations and compare the
results of the maximization problem (23) with welfare in the Cremer and Pestieau
model [see Appendix A.2] which calls for full social insurance. The simulation is
done for all possible combinations of κ1 and κ2. The parameters ensure ˆ γ1l > ˆ γ2h
for all t. At the optimum, we ﬁnd γ∗ = ˆ γ1l. The optimal policy parameters for
the ZB regime are in the intervals t∗ ∈ [0.31;0.37], τ∗ ∈ [10.2;14.7] and γ∗ ∈
[0.20;0.23]. For the CP regime, we obtain t∗ = 0.375 and τ∗ = 14.6.
In Figure 4, the simulation results are presented. In the upper left corner κ1 = 1
and κ2 = 0, i.e., health and productivity are perfectly positively correlated. In the
lower right corner, health and productivity are perfectly negatively correlated. On
thediagonal, thetwoareuncorrelated. FromFigure4, weobservetheimplications
of Proposition 1: the ZB proposal is superior if κ1 = 0 and κ2 > 0 and the two
schemes perform equally well for κ1 = κ2 = 0.
Figure 4 gives a clear picture. The ZB proposal is more likely to perform bet-
ter, the less positive the correlation of health and productivity. In this example,
the ZB proposal even yields higher welfare if health and productivity are posi-
tively correlated. Large values of κ1 and low values of κ2, which make health and
18productivity more positively correlated, make the CP model with full social insur-
ance more attractive. Overall, this comparison supports the argument by Zweifel
and Breuer. Premium subsidies and risk-based premium may perform better than
social insurance since they target transfers better to the worst-off.12
Changes in the parameters πh,θ1,L and ε rotate the line separating the regimes
around the origin. Equation (26) shows that an increase in πh leads to a counter-
clockwise rotation, making it more likely that regime ZB is superior. With respect
to the other parameters, it is not possible to determine the effects analytically.
Numerical simulations yield the following results:
• Increasing the share of low-productivity individuals θ1 makes it less likely
that the ZB proposal is superior. This can be explained by an increase in
transfers in the ZB proposal, causing more efﬁciency losses due to distorted
labor supply.
• Increasing medical expenditure L favors the social insurance solution. This
can be explained by ∂ˆ γ1l/∂L > 0 since ˆ γ1l depends positively on the health
insurance premium [equation (11)] which is increasing in L. As a conse-
quence, theincentiveconstraintfortheZBproposalbecomes morestringent
and the transfer system can be less generous to 1h-individuals.
• Increasing the elasticity of labor supply ε also puts the CP solution at an
advantage. This effect can be explained by the additional labor supply dis-
tortions induced by the ZB proposal.
4.4 The Swiss approach
In this section, we examine a regime (CH) with full social insurance, s = 1, and
premium subsidies to all low-productivity individuals. Such a system is akin to
the current Swiss scheme which relies on social insurance. Depending on the
canton of residence, a subsidy is granted as soon as health insurance costs more
than a percentage of taxable income, e.g. 8 percent in Zug and 12 percent in
Schaffhausen.13
12We also ran numerical simulations for ˆ γ2h > ˆ γ1l. Again, the ZB proposal is likely to perform
better the more negativethe correlationbetween health and productivityand can be superior if this
correlation is positive. A difference is that the CP model yields higher welfare for κ1 = κ2 = 0.
13In contrast to the regime we examine, the Swiss system has mandatory copayments.
19Comparing this regime with the ZB-proposal, it can be examined whether pre-
mium subsidies are complements rather than substitutes for social insurance. In-
deed, premium subsidies introduce non-linear income taxation. In the ZB model,
the effective marginal income tax is t+γ for 1h-types and t for all other individu-
als. From the theory of optimal non-linear income taxation, it is well known that
a higher marginal tax rate for low-productivity individuals can be optimal.14 The
intuition is that the efﬁciency losses of high marginal tax rates are lower for these
individuals than for high-productivity types. This reasoning should apply with
and without social insurance.
Since social insurance makes high and low-risk types equally well-off given pro-
ductivity, the introduction of premium subsidies effectively leads to a two-bracket
linear income tax with a marginal income tax t +γ for low incomes and t for
high incomes. Such a scheme has been analyzed by Slemrod et al. (1994). Using
a utility function with no income effects on labor supply, they ﬁnd that a opti-
mal tax system features decreasing marginal tax rates if the task is to redistribute
to low-productive individuals.15 In our model, premium subsidies impose de-
creasing marginal tax rates since additional transfers are paid if income is low in
relationship to expenditure on health insurance.
To examine the optimal solution for regime CH, we ﬁrst note that the critical
values of γ must be uniform for each productivity type since types differ only in
productivity with full social insurance:
ˆ γ1l = ˆ γ1h = ˆ γ1 > ˆ γ2l = ˆ γ2h = ˆ γ2.
We set γ ∈ [ˆ γ2,ˆ γ1) which implies that all low-productivity individuals will use the




where σ1 = ¯ πL−γw1l1(t,τ,1,γ).
14See Stiglitz (1982) for an analysis with two productivity types.
15Slemrod et al. (1994) point out a mistake in Sheshinski (1989) who stated the opposite result.







ˆ γ1 > γ ≥ ˆ γ2.
Again, we assume GHH-preferences and maximin welfare (see Appendix A.4).
Comparing regime CH with the ZB proposal, we can prove the following result.
Proposition 2: With GHH preferences (5), social insurance combined with pre-
mium subsidies makes the worst-off better off if all low-productivity individuals
are high-risk types (κ1 = 1).
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
Proposition 2 shows that social insurance can be an important instrument even
if premium subsidies are in place. If all low-productivity individuals are high
risks, there are no 1l-types who receive premium subsidies. The transfers in
both regimes therefore target equally well low-productivity, high-risk individu-
als. Regime CH, however, leads to an additional welfare gain. Through social
insurance it provides additional transfers to 1h-types without any efﬁciency loss.
It can therefore be expected that regime CH performs particularly well if the share
of high-risks among low-productivity individuals is high.
With ∆W ≡WZB−WCH and α = (1−ν)W− ν
1−ν, we obtain the following results
with respect to changes in κ1 and κ2:
∂∆W
∂κ1















   
 
WZB=WCH
= αθ1θ2(πh−πl)L+µ∗ ∂ˆ γ2
∂κ2
> 0, (30)
where µ∗ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange-multiplier associated with the incentive constraint.
Equation (29) shows that an increase in κ1 has a negative effect in both regimes.
In regime CH, premium subsidies for all low-productivity types increase as social
health insurance becomes more expensive. Additionally, the incentive constraint









Figure 5: Comparison between ZB and CH
GHH utility, w1 = 5, w2 = 10, πl = 0.2, πh = 0.5, θ1 = 0.5, L = 15, ε = 1.
πl)L and µ∗∂ˆ γ2/∂κ1. In the ZB solution, more transfers have to be given to 1h-
types leading to higher losses due to reduced labor supply. This is measured by
θ1δ. The overall effect on ∆W is ambiguous.16
From equation (30), it can be seen that an increase in κ2 only affects regime CH.
First, it increases the government’s expenditures for all low-productivity types
and, second, the incentive constraint becomes more binding, ∂ˆ γ2/∂κ2 > 0. There-
fore, an increase in κ2 makes the ZB proposal superior.
It is not possible to derive obvious results with respect to the other parameters
of the model. Therefore, we again perform numerical simulations and compare
the results of the maximization problem (28) with welfare in the ZB model as
given by (23). At the optimum, we always ﬁnd that γ∗ = ˆ γ2. The optimal policy
parameters fortheCH regimeare in theintervalst∗ ∈[0.34;0.36],τ∗ ∈[10.6;13.1]
and γ∗ ∈ [0.05;0.13].
Figure 5 shows the simulation results for our benchmark case. As predicted,
16Note that the negative effect of increased social insurance premiums in regime CH is only a
fraction θ1 of the negativeeffect in regimeCP [see equation(24)]. In contrast to regime CP, higher
social insurancepremiumsaffectwelfare onlybyincreasedpremiumsubsidies to low-productivity
individuals.
22regime CH is superior for κ1 = 1 and raising κ2 puts the ZB proposal at an ad-
vantage. Increasing κ1 is in favor of regime CH as the additional distortions in
labor supply are smaller. Again the ZB solution is more likely to be superior,
the more negative the correlation between health and productivity. Compared to
the CP model, however, the range of parameters is much smaller. This shows
that a considerable part of advantage of the ZB proposal can be explained by
the introduction of non-linear taxation. The increase in the marginal tax rate for
low-productivity individuals does not decrease welfare as argued by Zweifel and
Breuer (2006b) but rather serves to increase welfare in a second-best setting. Our
main insight is therefore that premium subsidies are complements rather than sub-
stitutes to social insurance for a large range of parameters.
Changes in the parameters πh,θ1,L and ε shift the line separating the regimes,
making it more likely that one regime is superior. Numerical simulations indicate
the following effects:
• As above, an increase in the high-risk types probability of illness πh is in
favor of the ZB solution. In contrast to regime CH, 2h-types do not receive
more transfers.
• A higher share of low-productivity individuals θ1 turns regime CH inferior.
This regime is more affected since transfers are also given to 1l-types which
results in more efﬁciency losses due to distorted labor supply.
• An increase in medical expenditure L makes it more likely that the ZB pro-
posal is superior since transfers are only given to 1h-types.
• Increasing the elasticity of labor supply ε puts the CH solution at an advan-
tage. An explanation for this result is a higher welfare gain by non-linear
taxation if the elasticity of labor supply is larger. Regime CH fares better
because it sets the same marginal tax rate for all low-productivity individu-
als.
We also ﬁnd that the CH solution always dominates the CP solution for GHH
preferences and maximin welfare. Since both regimes have full social insurance,
this shows that the introduction of premium subsidies generates a welfare gain
on its own. The intuition is that non-linear taxation with decreasing marginal tax










Figure 6: Results for maximin and utilitarian welfare
GHH utility, w1 = 5, w2 = 10, πl = 0.2, πh = 0.5, θ1 = 0.5, L = 15, ε = 1.
4.5 Extensions
So far, we assumed that the government maximizes a maximin social welfare
function and analyzed regimes in which some parameters of the general problem
presented in Section 4.1 were restricted. In this Section, we extend the analysis.
First, we examine how a utilitarian welfare function changes the results. Sec-
ond, we consider interior solutions for social insurance as well as more generous
premium subsidies schemes.
4.5.1 Utilitarian welfare
Figure 6 compares results for maximin and utilitarian welfare assuming logarith-
mic utility, i.e., u = ln( ). The differences are small. In general, the ZB solution
performs somewhat worse for utilitarian welfare.
Comparing the ZB solution to regime CP, i.e., full insurance without premium
subsidies, the two regimes fare equally well under an utilitarian objective if there
are no high-risk individuals in society, i.e., κ1 = κ2 = 0. There is no advantage of
having social insurance as all individuals are of the same risk type. Additionally,
24no beneﬁt of targeting towards 1h-types prevails as there are only low-risk types
in the society. For given κ1, however, an increase in κ2, puts the CP solution with
utilitarian welfare slightly at an advantage. The intuition is that social insurance
also redistributes from 2l- to 2h-types. Beneﬁts of the latter do not count with
maximin welfare but are considered with utilitarian welfare.
Contrasting theZB solutionwith theSwiss scheme CH showsthat theZB solution
performs slightly worse for utilitarian welfare. At ﬁrst sight, this may be surpris-
ing since 1l- types are now considered in the welfare function. They must pay
higher health insurance premiums in the CH solution. However, they also receive
a premium subsidy. Overall, the Swiss scheme makes 1l-types better off, which
implies that the case for this scheme is stronger with utilitarian welfare.
4.5.2 The general solution
ThethreeregimesCP, ZBandCH donotincludeallpossiblescenarios. Allrestrict
the recipients of premium subsidies (CP none, ZB only 1h-types, CH only low-
productivity types) and the extent of social insurance (either none or full).17 Thus,
they do not allow
• interior solutions for social insurance, i.e., 0 < s < 1, and
• premium subsidies for groups beyond the worst-off.
We therefore perform numerical simulations for the general problem presented in
Section 4.1 in which all parameters t, τ, s and γ are optimally chosen. Our results
are shown in Figure 7.
A common feature of all solutions are premium subsidies. The benchmark model
without premium subsidies is never optimal. For a positive correlation between
productivity and health, the Swiss regime, i.e., having full social insurance and
subsidizing all low-productivity individuals, is always the best regime. The ZB
proposal is only superior if health and productivity are highly negatively corre-
lated and the welfare function is utilitarian. However, an extended version of ZB,
17For regime CP, however, we showed in Appendix A.2 that s∗ = 1 is the solution irrespective
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Figure 7: General case
GHH utility, w1 = 5, w2 = 10, πl = 0.2, πh = 0.5, θ1 = 0.5, L = 15, ε = 1.
“ZBext”, which gives premium subsidies to all low-productivity individuals, i.e.,
1h- and 1l-types, can be optimal.
For maximin and utilitarian welfare, Figure 7 shows that premium subsidies com-
plement social insurance if health and productivity are positively correlated. By
contrast, the argument by Zweifel and Breuer requires a strong negative correla-
tion of health and productivity. Only then it is advantageous to abandon social
insurance and to solely rely on premium subsidies. Figure 7 also shows that inte-
rior solutionsforsocial insuranceare generally notoptimal. Only alongtheborder
between regime CH and ZBext are they possible.
Again, the results for maximin and utilitarian welfare do not differ much. The CH
regime performs slightly worse than the ZBext solution for utilitarian welfare.
In both cases, all low-productivity individuals receive premium subsidies. How-
ever, the cross-subsidization from 1l to 2h-types via the social health insurance
scheme in regime CH is not present in the ZBext solution. As utility of 1l-agents
is counted with utilitarian welfare, the ZBext solution is more likely to dominate
regime CH from a utilitarian perspective.
265 Conclusion
To best redistribute to the double disadvantaged, i.e., the high-risk, low-income
individuals, Zweifel and Breuer (2006a) propose to abandon social insurance and
to introduce premium subsidies combined with risk-based premiums instead. In
Switzerland, by contrast, premium subsidies are used in combination with social
insurance. This raises the question whether premium subsidies are substitutes or
complements to social insurance.
In this paper, we assessed the merits of premium subsidies in a theoretical frame-
work. First, we characterized the optimal solution for the ZB proposal as well
as for social insurance. We found that the correlation of health and productivity
is crucial. The ZB proposal is more likely to be superior, the less positive this
correlation.
Second, we compared the ZB proposal with a social insurance scheme that also
contains a premium subsidy. This changed the results strongly in favor of social
insurance and shows that a considerable part of the welfare advantage is due to
the fact that premium subsidies introduce an element of non-linear taxation. In
particular, wefound thatpremiumsubsidiescomplementsocialinsuranceifhealth
and productivityare positivelycorrelated. Our results apply for both maximin and
utilitarian welfare. Numerical simulations which allow for general combinations
of social insurance and premium subsidies conﬁrm our ﬁndings.
Our main insight is that premium subsidies are complements to social insurance
if health and productivity are positively correlated. Only if there is a considerable
negative correlation between productivity and health, premium subsidies substi-
tute for social health insurance. The ﬁndings by Cremer and Pestieau (1996)
that a positive correlation of health and income provides a strong argument for
social insurance can therefore be extended to include premium subsidies. This
supports the argument by McGuire (2006) that social insurance can be optimal
from a second-best perspective if poverty and ill health are positively correlated.
A limitation of our analysis is that we abstracted from moral hazard effects. This
would shift the argument in favor of the ZB proposal if there are considerableben-
eﬁts of making optimal cost sharing dependent on risk types. On the other hand,
thepremiumsubsidyreduces theincentivesto search fora well-pricedhealth plan.
27Furthermore, individuals who receive a subsidy will tend to over-insure.
Our analysis did not include the retired who cause a large part of health care
expenditure. Typically, social insurance is organized on a pay-as-you-go basis
and therefore redistributes between age groups. The impact of premium subsidies
then depends on how premiums vary with age. Future work could consider these
effects in a model with overlapping generations.
Finally, we assumed that risk-based premiums are actuarially fair given an in-
dividual’s risk type. Although a common assumption in the literature, studies by
Pauly and Herring (1999, 2007) indicate a substantial amount of risk pooling even
if risk-based premiums are allowed. An encompassing evaluation of the merits of
premium subsidies in combination with risk-based premiums would have to take
into account this aspect as well.
28A Appendix
A.1 GHH-preferences and the critical value ˆ γ
We ﬁrst determine the indirect utility functions. Solving problem (9) yields
c∗ = τ+[(1−γ−t)w]1+ε, l∗ = [(1−t−γ)w]ε. (A.1)











The solution to problem (10) is
c∗ = τ− p+[(1−t)w]1+ε, l∗ = [(1−t)w]ε. (A.3)











From setting ˆ V equal toV, we obtain the critical value




29A.2 GHH-preferences and the Cremer-Pestieau model
With maximin welfare (3), the government maximizes V1h(t,τ,s) which using






















(see (A.3) for the labor supply functions). Substitution of (A.5) into the maximin














































30A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
With preferences given by the utility function (5), labor supply is
ˆ l∗
1h = [(1−γ−t)w1]ε and l∗
ij = [(1−t)wi]ε for ij  = 1h. (A.7)
Inserting into (23) yields the following maximization problem for maximin wel-
fare:












ˆ γ1h > γ ≥ max{ˆ γ1l,ˆ γ2h}
(A.8)
where ˆ γij is given by (14). Substituting in the constraints into the objective func-















Equation (14) implies [(1−ˆ γ1l −t)w1]
































Thus, the ZB proposal is superior unless κ2 = 0 and therefore θ2h = 0. In this
case, the two solutions lead to the same welfare.2
31A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
With GHH-preferences and maximin welfare, problem (28) corresponds to







s.t. τ+θ1σ1 = tθ1w1+ε
1 (1−γ−t)ε+t(1−t)εθ2w1+ε
2
σ1 = ¯ πL−γ(1−γ−t)εw1+ε
1
ˆ γ1 > γ ≥ ˆ γ2
(A.9)
where






If all low-productivity individuals are high-risk types, the constraint
γ ≥ ˆ γ1l does not apply in the ZB solution as there are no 1l-types. Comparing
problems (A.8) and (A.9), we ﬁnd that they differ only in health insurance premi-
ums. To see which solution is better, we analyze the general problem







s.t. τ+θ1σ1 = tθ1w1+ε
1 (1−γ−t)ε+t(1−t)εθ2w1+ε
2
σ1 = [s¯ π+(1−s)πh]L−γ(1−γ−t)εw1+ε
1
ˆ γ1h > γ ≥ ˆ γ2h
(A.10)










This yields maximum utility V∗
1h(s) as a function of the share of health care ex-













where µ∗ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange-multiplier associated with the incentive constraint.
The term θ1(πh − ¯ π) is clearly positive. ∂ˆ γ2h/∂s < 0 since ˆ γ2h is increasing in
the health insurance premium [equation (11)] which is decreasing in s for high-
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